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Abstract
Norway reformed its pension system in 2011, introducing a Swedish-style, NDC system.
Contrary to expectations, the reform was largely supported by the dominant confederation
of trade unions, the LO. In this article, we look at LO involvement in the process at different
stages. Through qualitative interviews with key reform architects, we have traced the
process between 2005 and 2008, emphasising actors, meeting places and interests. Starting
from the insight that unions can influence through lobbying, bargaining and (the threat of)
mobilising, we suggest that lobbying can be a mutual process, where parties and unions
move each other’s positions. In addition, bargaining can take the form of behind-the-scenes
cooperation, as well as of negotiations in the classic, Nordic-style industrial relations sense.
Expanding on this framework, we suggest that the literature on pension reforms should pay
more attention to negotiated and voluntary labour market occupational schemes, and to
the importance of expertise and networks.
Key words: industrial relations; networks; old age pension; the Nordic model; trade unions;
welfare reform
Introduction
What is the role of trade unions in policy processes leading up to welfare state
reforms? In discussing this topic, the literature has moved beyond the view of trade
unions as driving forces for welfare state expansion (as in the power resources
literature; see for instance Korpi 1978), and of weakening trade unions as one of
the preconditions for retrenchment (as in the new politics literature; see for
instance Pierson 1996). Instead, there is a growing debate on the variation in trade
unions’ preferences and priorities, their strategies and their persistent potential
to have an impact on policies and to sustain and develop social partnerships
(e.g. Schludi 2005; Marier 2008; Hassel 2009; Häusermann 2010; Culpepper and
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Regan 2014). One insight that has come out of this literature is that trade unions’
ability to influence is highly contextual, depending on historical traditions, as well
as political and institutional factors (Anderson and Meyer 2003; Trampusch 2006;
Andersen et al. 2014). Therefore, there are important lessons to be learned from
an accumulation of case studies of single countries. In this article, we aim to
contribute to this cumulative literature through a case study of the reform of
old age pension in Norway.
The Norwegian pension reform, which was implemented in 2011, has a lot
in common with the previous Swedish reform: both countries introduced NDC
systems with flexible pensioning ages on actuarially neutral terms. However, the
Swedish pension reform was passed practically without union involvement
(Anderson and Meyer 2003; Schludi 2005; Marier 2008). In Norway, by contrast,
the dominant union – the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, LO – was at
the table, participating actively in designing the new system. Why would they do
that? Why would a trade union confederation actively promote and defend
a reform that significantly reduced the pensions of large member groups, in
a situation where there were no external pressures – such as a financial crisis, like
in Sweden – to do so? Answering these questions, we suggest, will shed light on the
politics of pension reform and the role of trade unions in advanced capitalist
societies, in particular on the complexity of union preferences and the various
power strategies modern unions have.
Pension reforms are special cases of welfare reforms: not only because they
are complicated and have long-term effects, but also because they are found at
the intersection of welfare policies and industrial relations (IR). An important
institution for IR in the Nordic countries is the coordinated and relatively
centralised systems of wage bargaining, combined with an extensive system of
tripartite dialogue. This has resulted in relatively high and compressed wages, but
also allowed for wage moderation, negotiated through centralised bargaining, as a
way to ease effects of external shocks (Andersen et al. 2014). However, the Nordic
countries differ in a number of areas in their IR tradition. Important for our
purposes here is a tradition for state intervention in stalled conflicts between the
social partners: this is common in Norway (and Denmark), but unheard of in
Sweden (Andersen et al. 2014, 17). Other examples of Norwegian exceptionalism
within the Nordic region include the traditionally strong ties between the Labour
party and the LO (Allern et al. 2007): The LO chair is still elected onto the Labour
party’s executive committee in Norway, and collective membership was phased
out only in 1997 (Allern et al. 2007). A third particular institutional feature of
Norwegian wage negotiations is that negotiated results are subjected to balloting
among the rank-and-file. This creates a need to secure broad member support,
making the Norwegian case particularly interesting when it comes to the role of
unions in IR and in policy reforms (Hippe and Nergaard 2016).
These exceptional features of the Norwegian model – the tradition for state
intervention in wage bargaining, the close party-union relationship and the
balloting of negotiated results – has implications for the dialogue on pensions. The
tradition for tripartite dialogue has created platforms for interaction, as well as
networks of trust and shared understandings that have been important also in
pension processes. Moreover, the tripartite cooperation did at one point give birth
to a pension scheme in which the social partners and the state are interweaved:
the negotiated early retirement scheme, AFP. This was negotiated by the social
























































































































partners in 1988 and later expanded. To break what looked like a deadlock in 1988,
the state intervened and committed to fund 1/3 of the expenses to AFP and also to
take on administration of the scheme. Elements of the pension system are based
on collective agreements in all the Nordic countries (Kangas et al. 2010), but
this heavy state involvement in a negotiated scheme is unusual. Even so, the
relationship between the party and the union is not all harmony. LO has repeatedly
shown that it is capable of blocking unpopular reforms, as it has done for decades
with regard to the sickness benefit scheme (Hagelund and Pedersen 2015).
In the next section, we present theoretical perspectives and previous research on
the role of trade unions in welfare reforms generally, and old age pension reforms
particularly. We move on to outline the Norwegian pension system and the main
contents of the reform, before presenting our data and analysis. We follow the
timeline of the reform from the launching of the Pension Commission’s report in
2004 to the wage negotiations in 2008. Analytically, we focus on three distinct
events in order to show the arenas and mechanisms for union involvement: the LO
congress in 2005, the Parliamentary settlement in 2007 and the wage bargaining
in 2008. We shall argue that this was a carefully orchestrated process, and that
different strategies were important at different stages. Nevertheless, as we shall show,
the outcome of this lengthy process was remarkably similar to what the Pension
Commission proposed at the outset, and thus far from the original status quo.
In this article, we limit our attention to the process in the private sector.
Following the pension reform, negotiations on occupational pensions in the public
sector were initiated in 2009 (Hagelund and Grødem 2017), but the negotiations
failed to fully produce the desired outcomes, and the process is still ongoing by
2018. However, the problems of reforming public sector occupational pensions
had no repercussions on the finalising of the reform process of state pensions.
White-collar unions play a crucial role in wage negotiations first of all in the public
sector. In the private sector, LO is dominant. A total of 52% of organised private-
sector workers are LO members (Nergaard 2016), and LO is by far the largest
organisation in the export industries, which set the pace for wage negotiations. This
implies that we are mainly dealing with the male-dominated, blue-collar sections
of LO, and that other unions outside the LO play a limited role in this story.
Perspectives on pension reform and the role of trade unions
While there is a booming literature on welfare state change and retrenchment,
the role of trade unions plays a limited role in these contributions (Starke 2006).
When the welfare state retrenchment literature brings in trade unions, it typically
highlights how trade unions are weakened in terms of membership and also
increasingly fragmented, and therefore not the impressive unified force it was
under “old” welfare policies (e.g. Häusermann 2010, 70ff; Culpepper and Regan
2014). In addition, new interest groups have emerged, sometimes organised around
welfare state arrangements. Unions thus increasingly appear as a bundle of interest
groups among many when welfare state reforms are on the table.
Other contributions assign a more active role to trade unions, even under new
circumstances. The literature on social pacts, for instance, obviously highlights
trade unions as key actors (Pochet et al. 2010; Avdagic et al. 2011). A growing
number of studies discuss how unions matter in advanced capitalist societies with
different social policy traditions, often with an emphasis on their complex priorities
























































































































and various power strategies. To understand a sustained social partnership in
Europe, Hassel (2009) differentiates between policy interests and power interests.
All actors have both policy interests and power interests, and differences in social
partnerships are shaped by the interest constellations of actors as much as by
institutional features. Trampusch (2006, 122–123, see also 2007) argues that
retrenchment policies could be supported by collective actors offering an oppor-
tunity of welfare delegation into occupational programmes, and hence that
research should take into consideration the IR system and the institutionalisation
of labour relations. Along the same lines, Andersen et al. (2014, 95) see Nordic
unions as willing and able to combine conflict and cooperation and to mobilise
both power and responsibility, taking part not only in crises resolution in the face
of external shocks but also in government reform proposals. In an influential
account on pension reforms in “Bismarckian” systems, Schludi (2005, 222) notes
that governments are typically the “first movers” in reform processes, so that trade
unions mainly play a reactive role. Trade unions typically prefer an outcome closer
to the status quo than the government does, and thus it will be crucial to find an
agreement point – a compromise that can satisfy both parties. Moreover, trade
unions typically are more sensitive to the interests of older workers than the
government is (Anderson and Meyer 2003, 24; Schludi 2005, 80). As strategies to
move the governments’ position, unions can use lobbying, bargaining and mobi-
lising (Schludi 2005). Lobbying implies to try to influence reform contents through
party channels, hoping to change the minds of a critical number of the ruling
party’s supporters. Bargaining implies to change reform outcomes by securing
a package deal with the government, often “trading” support for concessions
or side payments. Mobilising entails direct action, including public declarations,
demonstrations or strikes.
The three strategies are not mutually exclusive, and their implementation may
depend on political and institutional factors (Schludi 2005, 231). Lobbying may
be particularly successful in situations where the government is ideologically frag-
mented, and/or the unions control a sizeable share of key positions within the party
apparatus. The success of mobilising strategies, on the other hand, depends heavily
on rank-and-file involvement. Bargaining may be most efficient when unions have
credible arenas to exercise veto power. Several authors have suggested that countries
where the reform process has been basically parliamentary are able to introduce
more far-reaching and radical reform than countries where the social partners are
integrated into the pension system (e.g. Anderson and Meyer 2003; Marier 2008).
Trade unions have historically had the opportunity to establish welfare arrange-
ments on their own, supplementing or competing with state schemes. This includes
occupational pensions, which play an increasingly important role in many countries
(Natali 2017; Natali and Pavolini 2017). However, the turn to contractual pensions
plays a limited role in the analyses of pension reforms quoted so far, yet establishing
and controlling such schemes are obvious potential sources of power for trade
unions (Trampusch 2007; Grødem et al. 2018). One important reason for this is that
occupational pensions interact with state pensions, sometimes in such ways that they
can neutralise desired effects of state pension reforms. Increased pensioning age or
stronger built in incentives to work longer in state pensions will, for instance, be
rendered relatively irrelevant if most workers can retire early with a negotiated
pension. Therefore, contractual occupational pensions, based on collective agree-
ments, give trade unions a potential trump card in pension reform processes.
























































































































Another effect of occupational pensions is that they require trade unions to
build competence in the pension area. If they are going to negotiate pensions, and
make reasonable demands on pensions and on wages, they need their own
expertise. This is another potential power source, given the importance of expert
networks and “epistemic communities” (Maher 2017; Bridgen and Meyer 2018)
in pension reforms. Drawing on the tradition from Heclo (1978), these recent
contributions argue that the complexity of the pension issue is understood by
relatively few, so that in-depth discussions typically take place within limited
networks. A link can be made to recent work by Stefan Svallfors, who argues that
“new” politics are increasingly relying on nonelected experts (Svallfors 2016a,
2016b). While Svallfors’ mainly refers to paid political employees, he acknowledges
that “trade union and business association experts” can play this role (Svallfors
2016b, 4). If the trade unions are thrown out the main door in policymaking
through the erosion of corporate channels, then, it is possible that they are let
back in through the back door in roles as policy experts.
In what follows, we build on these insights regarding the importance of the
institutional set-up, expert networks and trade unions’ power strategies, including
ownership of negotiated pensions. We suggest that while Norway in many respects
is similar to Sweden in the sense that the pension reform process was anchored in
Parliament, trade unions were brought into the process in a way they were not in
Sweden. The reason for this was partly that the contractual early retirement scheme
(AFP), which was governed by the social partners and which had the potential to
undermine the reform, created a stumbling block. Politicians thus had important
reasons to cooperate with the unions also in the process of reforming the state
system, in a way that was not necessary in Sweden. Second, we adopt Schludi’s
(2005) concepts of lobbying and mobilisation, but we suggest an adaptation of
his concept of bargaining: bargaining can refer both to the formalised and insti-
tutionalised negotiation processes, and to less formal, behind-the-door cooperation
in what can be understood as an expert network. Hence, we will build on the
literature on expert networks, but placed in a Nordic setting.
The Norwegian pension reform
The Norwegian pension reform was initiated by the appointment of the Pension
Commission in 2001. The Pension Commission came as one in several initiatives,
launched by the first government of Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, to bring state
expenses under control. The Pension Commission was made up of all parties in
Parliament plus a few experts, while the social partners were not represented. The
leader of the Commission was a prominent Labour politician, former Minister of
Finance Sigbjørn Johnsen. The Commission reported in 2004 (NOU 2004:1) and
proposed a Swedish-style NDC scheme where all years of pension accrual up to the age
of 75 count equally, and a flexible pensioning age (62–75) on actuarially neutral terms.
These measures were intended to promote longer working careers. In addition, the
reform contained two pure retrenchment measures: longevity adjustment, and indexing
of pensions at 0.75% below the annual wage increase (Pedersen 2014). All political
parties in the Commission, with the exception of the two representatives from left-wing
Socialist Party and the right wing Progress Party, stood united behind the proposal.
This consensus was a good starting point, but the Commission’s proposal was
still just that: a commission’s proposal. Successive governments emphasised the
























































































































need to reach binding cross-party consensus in order to secure a sustainable reform
for the future. The Parliament therefore voted twice on the key principles of the
new pension system in what was called parliamentary settlements in 2005 and
2007. A settlement is basically an extended parliamentary process on a white paper,
and is seen as a recent parliamentary innovation that contributes to binding
political consensus in larger reforms (Narud et al. 2014). The settlement in spring
2005 (Finansdepartementet 2004–2005) included all parties in Parliament
except the Socialist Party and the Progress Party, and resolved the broad principles
for the new system. The settlement in 2007 (Arbeids- og inkluder-
ingsdepartementet 2006–2007) included all parties except the Progress Party, and
settled some of the issues – mainly related to the distribution profile – that had
been left open in 2005. Only after the second settlement a parliamentary bill was
drafted (Arbeids- og inkluderingsdepartementet 2008–2009), and the required
amendments to the National Insurance Act were passed in 2009.
The trade unions, most notably LO, had pursued their own pension policies well
before the Commission was appointed. The unions had long required an early
retirement scheme, yet in the course of the 1980s they realised this demand was not
going to be met in the National Insurance. In 1988, as mentioned, they took
matters into their own hands and negotiated their own – the AFP scheme. This was
an occupational scheme negotiated nationally and made available to all employees
in workplaces covered by collective agreements. The state agreed to administer the
scheme, and also to subsidise the scheme by 1/3 of the costs, in order to help land
the 1988 wage negotiations. This was one of the state interventions that are
common in Norway, but unusual elsewhere (Andersen et al. 2014). The scheme
was expanded during the 1990s, and since 1998 it had allowed for pensioning at the
age of 62 on the same terms as if the claimant had worked until the age of 67. The
AFP scheme was one of LO’s crown jewels. The Pension Commission, however,
understandably deemed the AFP scheme as incompatible with the new principles
of life-long pension accrual and flexible pensioning on actuarially neutral terms,
and proposed to end the state funding. This move would kill the scheme, which
was a worst-case scenario for LO.
The Pension Commission, then, laid the basis for parliamentary consensus,
while leaving the largest trade union fuming on the side-lines. The remainder of
this article outlines how LO was brought into the overall consensus and became an
important supporter of the pension reform.
Data and methods
Our analysis relies on qualitative interviews with informants who were central in
the pension reform process. We interviewed senior officials in the Ministry of
Labour and Social Inclusion,1 LO officials and staff (including former leaders Valla
and Flåthen), key politicians (including former Prime Ministers Stoltenberg and
Bondevik, former Minister of Labour and Social Inclusion Hansen, former
1 This Ministry has held different names over time: The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (1997–
2002), the Ministry of Social Affairs (2002–2004), the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2004–2005),
the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion (2006–2010), the Ministry of Labour (2010–2014), the
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2014–). For the sake of communication, we consistently refer to it
here as the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion.
























































































































Ministers of Finance Johnsen and Schjødt-Pedersen), as well as central players
in unions outside LO, and in the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO).
We also talked to a few independent experts. All in all, we carried out 14 interviews
with 18 informants between November 2015 and September 2016. Only one of
the respondents asked to participate did not respond to the invitation. All the
interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. A complete list of informants is
provided in Table A1 (Appendix).
Inspired by the process tracing method (Falleti 2016; Trampusch and Palier 2016),
we made it a key aim of the interviews to pinpoint the process in as much detail as
possible: who talked to whom when, under what circumstances and institutional
conditions, promoting which interests and so on. Both authors of this article parti-
cipated in almost all interviews, and when that was not possible we made contact
shortly afterwards to discuss the new information. Most of our informants had been
close to some parts of the process while absent or excluded from other parts of it, and
thus their narratives only partly overlapped. An important part of the analysis was
thus the ongoing dialogue between us, where we aimed to establish an overview of the
process, weighing the input from different informants against each other – and also
discussing what we needed to clarify in subsequent interviews with new informants.
By the end of the data collection, therefore, we were confident we had a good
overview of both meeting places, actors and the interests the actors sought to promote
in different settings. In the analytical phase, we went back and forth between our
memories of the interviews, our interpretations and the interview transcripts, in a
hermeneutic manner that deepened and clarified our understanding of the process.
We have also consulted some of the key documents produced during the
process. In this article, however, these documents are referred to mainly to fill out
the information given in the interviews, and do not play an independent role as
sources of information.
2005: getting the LO on board – mutual lobbying
All the larger parties in Parliament were committed to overarching principles of the
pension reform, and thus, in 2004, the Norwegian reform process was set to mimic
the almost purely parliamentary process than had taken place in Sweden ten years
earlier (Schludi 2005; Marier 2008). However, this is where the Norwegian story
turns interesting, as seen from the vantage point of the pension literature. Unlike
Swedish unions, LO did not offer “tacit acceptance” (Anderson and Meyer 2003)
for the new reform principles. LO had its own processes running with regard
to pensions, and our interviews indicate that they had not expected the 2004
Commission to be a game-changer. When the Commission reported, LO-leader
Gerd-Liv Valla was furious – in the interview we did with her, she called
the Commission’s proposal “unacceptable”. LO was particularly enraged by the
proposals to end public funding for AFP and to weaken occupational pensions in
the public sector, and also demanded a better “social profile” in the new pension
system. Moreover, LO was sceptical about the two most important cuts – longevity
adjustment and indexing.
Theoretically, given the solid backing for the reform in Parliament, LO could
have been left on the side-lines. However, Jens Stoltenberg – leader of the Labour
party, with clear ambitions to become Prime Minister after the 2005 election – had
other plans. Stoltenberg was a main proponent of the reform, and getting LO on
























































































































board was a strategic priority for him. He launched a one-man campaign to turn
LO around, starting with Gerd-Liv Valla. He did this, he said in his interview,
because he recognised LO’s “Veritas function”2: if LO launched a campaign saying
the reform had negative social consequences, his voters would believe it. LO
might not have much to play on with the Parliamentary opposition, but there was
an opposition to the pension reform within his own party. If LO joined this
opposition, it would not only be harder to mobilise support and win the election,
his future job as Prime Minister would also become infinitely more difficult.
In short, securing support from a broad alliance in Parliament would simply not be
enough. Stoltenberg therefore initiated and maintained close informal contact with
Gerd-Liv Valla in 2004/2005, and the two discussed pensions almost incessantly for
several months (as confirmed in both their interviews). Eventually they did reach
a consensus: Gerd-Liv Valla said she was honestly convinced by Stoltenberg’s
argument that when expected longevity increased it was only fair that people
should work a little longer. Stoltenberg, on the other hand, said that he too was
convinced about something important in these long and informal discussions: he
realised that distribution effects mattered, that he could not “sell” the reform solely
as a reform to safeguard public finances. Stoltenberg’s rhetoric thus changed
between 2001 and 2005 (as also noted by Ervik and Lindén 2015).
Labour’s policies on pensions in 2005 came to deviate somewhat from the
Pension Commission’s proposal, as the party and the union found common
ground. The Labour party by 2005 promoted a model of pension accrual that was
more beneficial to the lowest paid, and promised to maintain AFP and public
sector occupational pensions. Stoltenberg and Valla presented a joint proposal to
the Labour party’s executive committee along those lines, and as the two were
perceived as leaders of opposing fractions, the rest of the committee supported
their compromise.
The upcoming LO Congress in May 2005 was, however, the main stumbling
block. The Congress is LO’s main political assembly, held every 4 years with
300 elected delegates from all over the country. The LO leaders and the Labour
party had found a compromise, but this was of limited interest if the LO Congress
voted it down. At the Congress, LO leaders stressed repeatedly that the Congress
was not invited to vote on the Pension Commission’s proposal, but rather on the
Labour/LO model. Jens Stoltenberg was invited to the Congress, and held a
carefully prepared address where he defended the main principles of the reform
(LO 2005). He went far in threatening the Congress: if the delegates voted the
Labour/LO model down, it would cause disruption and weaken Labour’s chances
of winning the upcoming election. The passing of the reform would then be left to
the parties on the right, who would ride roughshod over LO’s interests.
The (left-wing) opposition at the LO Congress initially raised three demands
that diverged from the LO-Labour consensus, but allowed two of them to fall
during the debates. However, the final demand stood: no decision on adjustments
for longevity or indexation at this point in time (LO 2005). The opposition argued
that one did not know how long anyone would live in the future, and thus there
could be no need to rush into a decision on longevity (LO 2005, 320). This demand
had solid backing. Several of our informants who were present at the Congress
2 Veritas, which he refers to, is Det Norske Veritas, an organisation established in 1864 with the purpose
of providing reliable classification of Norwegian ships. Quote from our interview in April 2016.
























































































































talked how Gerd-Liv Valla personally initiated a frantic, last-minute campaign the
night before the final vote in order to secure support for the LO executive proposal.
According to one informant, Valla and (then) deputy leader Roar Flåthen put all
their authority behind the proposal, and the last-minute campaign worked: the
majority proposal passed, with 189 votes against 121. The Labour party thus
got the mandate it hoped for in the negotiations with the government, and a
parliamentary settlement on pensions was formalised on 26 May 2005 (Stortinget
2004–2005). The 2005 compromise left a lot of work, and a lot of hard negotia-
tions, to be done, but it got the reform over the first hurdle. As Stoltenberg and
others had hoped, old age pensions and the pension reform were mainly kept out
of the 2005 election campaign. Labour did well in the election, and Jens Stoltenberg
became Prime Minister for a coalition government made up of Labour, the Socialist
Party and the Centre party.
This story from 2005, we suggest, was a story of mutual lobbying and exchange:
Stoltenberg lobbied LO, in a long campaign that culminated with his speech to the
Congress. Simultaneously, LO lobbied the Labour leadership – of which the LO
leader was a part – and convinced the party to drop the proposal to end state funding
of AFP and to improve the social profile of the reformed state pensions. All in all, this
made for a successful “party-to-union” lobbying campaign, in an exchange where
both sides won some and lost some. The Stoltenberg strategy was, however, risky, as
the issue of the contractual AFP programme was swept under the carpet and few,
if any, saw how an early retirement scheme could be reformed and coexist with a
DC-styled old age pensions scheme. In addition, the more precise distributional
profile of pension accumulation in the new system was still to be decided.
2007: towards a settlement – trust and expertise
The 2005 Stoltenberg government started immediately to prepare for a second
broad pension settlement in the Parliament. A new White Paper was presented on
20 October 2006, almost exactly one year after the government took office
(Arbeids- og inkluderingsdepartementet 2006–2007). The laboratory for working
out the White Paper, we learned through the interviews, was the Ministry of
Labour and Social Inclusion. All our informants hinted at this process – most of
them had been directly involved in it – but they differed in how concrete infor-
mation they gave. One of the most candid accounts came from Bjarne Håkon
Hansen, who was Minister of Labour and Social Inclusion at the time:
There were two types of meetings. One was working meetings in the Ministry
of Labour and Social Inclusion. There met [himself, senior bureaucrats, and
high-level LO representatives]. And then you have the pension group in the
government. There is Jens [Stoltenberg] and [political advisors from the two
coalition partners]. […] And we keep going on with those two advisors, back
and forth, and eventually we end up with Kristin [Halvorsen, leader of the
Socialist Party] and Åslaug [Haga, leader of the Centre Party]. And, I don’t
remember, but I think Kristin and Åslaug just realise in the end that Jens is
never going to back down on this. […]. (B.H. Hansen, interview January 2016)
In other words, the government worked parallel with developing the pension
model and anchoring it among the coalition partners. This was a two-step process:
the features of the model were worked out in a group made up by Labour members
























































































































of government, senior bureaucrats in the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion
and central LO representatives. This group met frequently and worked intensely.
Then there were the other kind of meetings, where the aim was to get the support
of the government coalition. The differences between the parties were too big to be
handled at the level of political advisors, and thus the party leaders were brought
in. However, the agenda in these meetings was not to open up for the coalition
partners to make their mark on the reform, but rather to convince them that
the choices made in the working group were the best ones.
Interestingly, the Ministry of Finance was barely involved in this process. Jens
Stoltenberg explained why:
It is quite remarkable that Finance was not involved in that process. And that
was because Kristin Halvorsen was there, and even though I trusted Kristin,
I did not trust the Socialist party. And there were so many political advisors
from the Socialist Party in that Ministry, it would just have slipped and made
it difficult for the Socialist Party to get on board. (J. Stoltenberg, interview
April 2016)
Later in the interview, he returned to the subject:
None of the usual hearings. None of the usual analyses of consequences. None
of the usual open debates in Parliament. Closed in the chambers, in the
cupboard. […] Even secret to large sections of the LO executive! Secret to
two-thirds of the government!
Stoltenberg openly acknowledged that in terms of democracy and ideals of open
procedures this was a dilemma. His justification was that this process was so
complex, and it was vital to maintain trust and create a space where ideas could be
tried out without the press and the opposition breathing down their necks. In the
absence of this closed space, he argued that positions would freeze too early,
participants would not be able to move from established positions without losing
face and the process would have imploded.
The process towards the second parliamentary settlement illustrates very clearly
the importance of networks in pension policies (Bridgen and Meyer 2018), and also
point to the role of expertise and trust relationships in modern politics more
generally (Svallfors 2016a, 2016b). Many of our informants remarked on the sense
of trust that developed between the members of this group, noting in particular
how trade union executives and ministry advisors found common ground and
worked as a team. An important aspect of this trust relationship was the confidence
that no one would leak to the press, so that the group could work in peace. This
trust was not extended to other actors, not even advisors in the Minister of Finance.
In this process, LO appears to have been seen by leading Labour politicians as
fully loyal collaborators, and such relationships can be crucial in “the hard and
unforgiving environment” that modern politics, including the relationship with the
press, entails (Svallfors 2016a, 3). In addition, expertise in the complex pension
area is hard to come by, but it can be found in the LO secretariat. LO could thus
provide both loyalty and expertise.
The discussions leading up to the second White Paper (Arbeids- og inkluder-
ingsdepartementet 2006–2007) and the following parliamentary settlement were
about details of the new system rather than principles. None of the parties came
























































































































into the discussion with a blueprint for their preferred outcome, and the setting
was informal and dialogue-oriented. We suggest that the Norwegian set-up, with
long traditions for tripartite dialogue, provided the ground for these proceedings.
Ironically, however, the tripartite cooperation had also produced results that made
close contact between the union and the Ministry necessary: the social partners and
the government were locked together in the AFP scheme, which was owned by the
partners but administered and partially funded by the state. If the work incentives
inherent in the new system were to have any meaning, the contractual early
retirement scheme – which offered 62-year-olds the opportunity to retire on the
same terms as 67-year-olds – had to be significantly remodelled.
2008: tripartite dialogue and an expensive occupational scheme
AFP was addressed in the wage negotiations in the private sector in 2008.
The stakes were high: large sections of LO had accepted the reform of state
pensions partly because they expected to compensate for any losses through
contractual schemes. The year 2008 was the first time this assumption was
explicitly confronted. Also, obviously, because the scheme was contractual, the
action now shifted to a new arena: in 2006–2007, LOs were guest actors in a play
that mainly took place on the political arena. In 2007–2008, the main arena was the
bipartite private sector wage negotiations, where politicians and bureaucrats
participated only to the extent the social partners would let them.
The negotiations were primarily between LO and NHO (the Confederation of
Norwegian Enterprise). NHO welcomed the reform in state pensions, and were
willing to make concessions in the AFP negotiations in order to safeguard the gains
in the pension reform. Our interviews show that NHO’s primary interest was to
keep costs stable for employers; they had no strong interests in the distribution
profile of the AFP scheme. The main discussions on AFP, therefore, were between
LO and the government, as the government partly funded the scheme.
The 2008 process started more or less where the settlement in the Parliament
left off. Only two months after the 2007 settlement, the Minister of Labour
and Social Inclusion established a committee to prepare the negotiations. This
committee included many of the same players who had been instrumental before
the settlement, with the important exception that the NHO now was fully included.
The committee issued a report that worked as a background document for
the upcoming negotiations, but did not – and did not aspire to – come up with a
proposal that could be sanctioned by the partners.
The document laid the groundworks for an elite compromise. In this round,
however, elite compromise would not do: the social partners were negotiating,
and the final result would be balloted. Among the LO rank-and-file, there was
considerable scepticism against touching the AFP, and the left-wing opposition
were rattling their sabres. Thinking ahead, Roar Flåthen – now LO leader and a
main player in the negotiations – called a meeting with two key opposition leaders
early in the negotiation process and outlined his preferred outcome. He sketched a
solution where AFP was remodelled into a lifelong addition to state pensions, to be
drawn on actuarially neutral terms, but where the initial level was so generous
that the oldest cohorts would obtain the same replacement level at 62 as they did
under the prevailing scheme when combining AFP and state pensions. In his own
words – “those two gentlemen though it over fairly quickly, then said yes, if you can
























































































































get that, Roar, we’re in” (R. Flåthen, interview November 2015). Then Flåthen went
back to the negotiating table and announced that if he got his way, he could almost
guarantee LO support.
Flåthen’s strategy was effective, and the negotiations were summed up as an
astonishing victory for LO. The contractual AFP scheme survived as a top-up to
the state pension scheme, offering life-long pensions to employees covered. The
end result was that the government put about NOK 50 billion on the table to ease
the transition from the “old” to the “new” AFP. The Ministry, however, also felt
victorious: it got an AFP that complimented the National Insurance pension
instead of undermining it. The 50 billion was an estimate of accumulated sums
over a long period, and could be seen as a long-term investment in the overall
reform. Similarly, NHO was satisfied: they achieved system change without
increasing employer costs.
Among LO rank-and-file, however, not everybody was convinced. LO launched
an information campaign immediately after the conclusion of the negotiations
to promote the result. The efforts that had been made beforehand to bring the
left-wing opposition leaders on board now paid off: those were strong union
leaders with considerable credibility on the LO left, and they campaigned actively
together with LO executives to ensure support. In the end, the ballots had an
exceptionally high turn-out, and 76% voted in favour of the negotiated result. This
concluded the pension reform process in the private sector and the final bill on the
new state pension could be passed through the parliament.
The 2008 process was bargaining in the real sense. However, it was a set-up that
would not have been possible in countries with a weaker tradition for tripartite
dialogue: the social partners negotiated, but the state was only a phone-call away,
willing to smooth the negotiations with literally billions of kroner. The process thus
drew heavily on the traditions for tripartite cooperation. The outcome would
probably not have been possible, had it not been for LO’s involvement in
the process leading to the 2007 settlement in parliament. This process fostered
relationships of trust, as well as mutual understandings of the issues. In the end,
the chain of processes led to a result where all the key actors could claim victory:
Labour politicians got their reform, complete with harmonised contractual
pensions, and the trade unions got an exceptionally generous transition period.
Discussion
This analysis leaves no doubt that the pension reform was a carefully orchestrated
process. Jens Stoltenberg, as Labour leader throughout this period and as Prime
Minister from 2005, was in a position to determine the timing of events, and he
managed this role carefully. In the interview we did with him, he freely admitted
that he did not envision at the beginning of the process how this was going to
succeed, he only knew that it would have to be done one step at the time. The
thorniest issues had to be postponed, as the aim early in the process was to secure
broad support for the basic features of the new national pension model. The
relationship with LO moved from one of “mutual lobbying” to one of networking
and bargaining. Indeed, many of our informants from LO talked about this as a
continuous process: this was the period when they buzzed in and out of the
government’s offices and discussed pensions, the distinction between the National
Insurance pension and the AFP is blurred in their narratives. Nevertheless, the
























































































































reform architects made sure that the National Insurance process was finalised
before the real debate on the contractual early retirement scheme started, so that
the arguably less predictable AFP process was not allowed to interfere with the
debate over the National Insurance. The timing and sequencing of events
undoubtedly mattered.
Following from this, this study confirms what has been pointed out by others
(Allern et al. 2007) – that the relationship between the LO and the Labour party in
Norway was very close even by the early 2000s, and perhaps closer than discussed in
most IR and welfare state literature. In the process described here, we have seen that
the Labour leader was given ample space to address the LO Congress in 2005 to argue
for the party’s politics, LO was invited in to design welfare policy schemes and the
Labour-led government followed the 2008 negotiations between the social partners
like a shadow. The areas of combat changed from LO’s home field (the Congress) to
Labour’s (governmental offices) back to LO’s again (the negotiations), but the key
figures in the party and the union maintained close dialogue irrespective of where the
formal action was. In addition, while LO was actively involved, other potentially
important players were side-lined. This included the coalition parties in the
2005–2013 governments and, even more strikingly, the Ministry of Finance.
We have suggested that the first phase considered here can be described as “mutual
lobbying”. The leader of the Labour party and the leader of LO discussed the principles
of the pension reform, frequently and informally, and in the process both adapted
their policies and rhetoric. Their compromise was later accepted by the Labour party’s
executive committee, LO’s executive committee and, finally, the LO Congress.
The second phase was one of expert networking. We suggest that the most
striking feature of this stage of the process is the inclusion and exclusion of actors:
when the newly elected Labour-led coalition government was to fine-tune its
pension policy, Labour took the lead and invited LO into the process. Not the
government coalition partners, not the Ministry of Finance, not the finance
industry – LO. Also, this took place without the usual formal hearings and
underway reports to the parliament. This is indicative, we have argued, of the
importance of expert networks in pension policies, and also of the potential
importance of durable networks where mutual trust develops over time. LO and
the Labour party have, historically, had this close relationship in Norway. Also, we
have suggested that the existence of occupational pensions and a contractual AFP
scheme made it necessary for LO to build and maintain competence on pensions
within its own secretariat. The historical relationship between the party and the
trade union, the Nordic-style IR regime and the pension nexus in Norway made
LO’s role in this phase possible.
The shared understandings developed in the second phase were carried over to the
third phase, which was bargaining in the classical sense. LO had the upper hand
in this round, as it claimed ownership to the contractual scheme being negotiated,
and the Labour-led government only got its desired result after putting considerable
amounts of money on the table. The outcome was seen as a major victory for LO,
who finally got paid for years of loyal support to the Labour-party-initiated reform.
Conclusion
What light can this case study shed on the role of trade unions in welfare
retrenchment processes more generally? When seen in the light of key
























































































































contributions like Schludi (2005) and Marier (2008), the Norwegian case is an
anomaly. Schludi (2005) makes the case that reform architects must secure the
support of either the opposition in Parliament or of the trade unions, and provides
a nuanced discussion of the conditions under which politicians prefer to pursue
each option. Moreover, unions are seen to push the reform compromise as close to
status quo as possible. From this vantage point, one must wonder at the Norwegian
reform architects’ double effort: the Pension Commission, in which all parties
in parliament were represented, had laid the ground for a solid “Swedish-style”
parliamentary consensus. However, Stoltenberg referred to LO’s “Veritas position”:
given LO’s credibility on social issues, intensive LO lobbying against his own party
would have made his life as Prime Minister difficult. Moreover, he knew from the
start that AFP had to be dealt with at some point. He also knew that an open
confrontation with LO on AFP would be traumatising on both sides, and should be
avoided at any cost. This is perhaps the most important reason why Stoltenberg
and his fellow Labour leaders worked so hard to anchor the key principles of the
new pension system within LO from 2004 onwards: if LO adopted these principles,
they might agree to redesign AFP along the same lines later. As we have seen, this
is precisely what happened.
Against this background, we have suggested that contractual pensions –
especially when they are designed so that they can neutralise or undermine reforms
in state pensions – have potential to represent a formidable source of power for
trade unions. This point has received little attention in previous literature on
unions’ power strategies in welfare reforms.
A second point that should be made is that the Norwegian IR regime, combined
with the historically close ties between the party and the union, has laid the ground
for a deep sense of trust between the parties. The difficult bargaining on the future
pension system was done “in the cup-board” – to paraphrase Stoltenberg – between
bureaucrats, the responsible Minister and LO officials. This select group built on
the informal channels nurtured in the tripartite dialogue and the tradition for
confidentiality.
A third point that comes out of this analysis is that when studying lobbying and
bargaining processes, we should pay more attention to the role of expertise.
Modern politics are complicated, and often even decisionmakers struggle to make
sense of the issues (Svallfors 2016a). Nonelected experts, then, be they political
advisors, political secretaries, think-tank employees or trade union/business
association professionals, can therefore play a major role. This is not least true in
pension politics (Bridgen and Meyer 2018). Lobbying and bargaining thus not only
implies promoting one’s point of view, but can also mean participation in mutual
processes of problem construction, shared understandings and a joint search for
acceptable solutions. This was LO’s role in Norway in 2006/2007, and under-
standings developed in this phase were then carried over to the 2008 formal
negotiations.
In one aspect, however, LO’s role in the Norwegian reform was textbook: LO
very clearly prioritised the interests of older workers over younger. The entire AFP
settlement was about securing the same level of pension for ageing workers about
to retire. Younger cohorts will not be sheltered from the retrenchment elements in
the reform in the same way (as shown by Fredriksen and Stølen 2015).
In the introduction, we highlighted the need for an accumulation of case studies
to shed light on the complex interplay between social policy and IR in the field of
























































































































pension reform. We have analysed a country where trade unions remain powerful,
where the relationship between the largest trade union and the Labour party is
close and where there is a strong tradition – even by Nordic standards – for
tripartite cooperation. We suggest that the observations we have made about the
role of contractual pensions, trust between the parties, as well as of expert
networks, will have validity even beyond this immediate context, although exactly
how this plays out will of course vary between different settings. Still, the
institutional settings are changing even in Norway. It remains to be seen whether
the 2011 pension reform will go down in history as the pinnacle of the Nordic-style
tripartite cooperation model, or whether future reforms again will be able to
draw on the same mechanisms of mutual lobbying and networking combined
with hard power.
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Table A1. List of informants
Name (Unless
Anonymised) Position/Role Interviewed When
Jens Stoltenberg Prime Minister 2005–2013 Leader of the Labour Party
2002–2014
April 2016
Kjell Magne Bondevik Prime Minister 2001–2005 September 2016
Sigbjørn Johnsen Leader of the Pension Commission, former Minister
of Finance
January 2016
Bjarne Håkon Hanssen Minister of Labour and Social Affairs 2005–2008 January 2016
Karl Eirik Schjøtt-
Pedersen
Minister of Finance 2000–2001 Secretary of State
at the Prime Minister’s office, 2006–2009
January 2016
Roar Flåthen Deputy Leader LO, 2001–2007; Leader,
LO 2007–2013
November 2015
Gerd-Liv Valla Leader LO, 2001–2007 March 2016
Secretary of State, the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs, 2005–2012
February 2016
Senior Official, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs December 2015
Senior Advisor, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs November 2015
Senior Advisor, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs December 2015
Economist, Virke; the Enterprise Federation of Norway November 2015
Chief Economist, UNIO (The Confederation of Unions
for Professionals)
November 2015
Chief Economist, LO (the Norwegian Confederation
of Trade Unions)
November 2015
Deputy Director, NHO (Confederation of Norwegian
Enterprise)
November 2015
Director, NHO November 2015
Deputy Director, NHO November 2015
Member of the Pension Commission
as independent expert
November 2015
Journal of Public Policy 17
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
01
43
81
4X
18
00
01
44
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
://
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 N
or
w
eg
ia
n 
So
ci
al
 R
es
ea
rc
h,
 o
n 
30
 Ja
n 
20
19
 a
t 1
0:
01
:1
8,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
Ca
m
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
://
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
